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Abstract 
Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS) are not only common and distressing, but 
also are typically poorly managed in general medical settings. Those suffering from 
these problems tend to incur significantly higher health costs than the general 
population. There are many effective treatments for different MUS; these are almost 
entirely based on Cognitive-behavioural approaches. However, the wide range of 
treatment protocols tend to be “syndrome specific”. As such, they do not generalise 
well in terms of training and application, making them expensive and difficult to 
disseminate, suggesting the desirability of developing a transdiagnostic approach. The 
general basis of such a CBT grounded transdiagnostic approach is considered, and the 
particular need to incorporate cognitive elements of both anxiety/health anxiety 
(threat) and depression (loss) is highlighted. Key empirically grounded and evidence 
based processes (both specific and general) previously identified as underpinning the 
maintenance of MUS are delineated. The way in which these can be combined in a 
transdiagnostic model which accounts for most MUS presentations is presented and 
linked to a formulation driven transdiagnostic treatment strategy, which is described. 
However, the need to take more syndrome-specific issues into account in treatment is 
identified, suggesting that the optimum treatment may be a hybrid 
transdiagnostic/specific approach with formulation, shared understanding, belief 
change strategies and behavioural experiments at its heart. The generalisation of such 
approaches to psychological problems occurring in the context of “Long Term 
Conditions” is identified as a further important development which is now within 
reach.  
  
 
Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS) are an extremely common source of 
distress and disability for service users attending both primary and secondary health 
care settings. Those experiencing such problems represent not only a substantial pool 
of unresolved distress and disability but also a considerable drain on health care 
resources, which are deployed to no effect or may even worsen their problems in such 
cases. These patients gain little benefit from current medical treatments, which by 
definition will be misdirected, and are seldom offered any psychological treatment to 
help them deal more effectively with these problems. The way in which MUS are 
presently managed thus represents an expensive failure to meet important health care 
needs in people where there is evidence of high levels of psychological distress and 
unnecessary disability. In this paper we consider how we might better understand and 
treat psychological aspects of MUS. First, we will consider the prevalence and impact 
of such problems on the health care system and society as a whole, particularly 
considering economic issues. The issues raised by the wide range of presentations and 
treatments for MUS are considered, which strongly suggest the need for a more 
transdiagnostic approach. We therefore describe how they might be conceptualised 
and treated in psychological terms from an empirically grounded perspective 
(Salkovskis, 2009). 
 
MUS are common and costly 
Estimates of the prevalence of MUS both in clinical and general populations vary due 
to the diversity in definitions of as well as diagnostic and operational issues. 
Epidemiological studies have shown that MUS are the most common group of 
symptoms in primary care (Katon, Ries, & Kleinman, 1984) responsible for up 35% 
of visits in GPs (Peveler, Kilkenny, & Kinmonth, 1997;Simon & VonKorff, 1991). 
Much of the data are specific to particular groups of symptoms; for example 
prevalence rates for Chronic Fatigue (CF) and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) in 
the adult general population have been estimated at  30.5% and  1.0% respectively 
with CFS largely unrecognized by GPs (van't Leven, Zielhuis, Jw, Verbeek, & 
Bleijenberg, 2010).CFS in primary care ranges from 1.6% to 2,1% (Cho, Menezes, 
Hotopf, Bhugra, & Wessely, 2009) and point prevalence of CF for UK primary care 
has been estimated at 11.3% (Wessely, Chalder, Hirsch, Wallace, & Wright, 1997) 
Fibromyalgia estimates are reported to be 2%- 2.4% (Mas et al., 2008; Wolfe, Ross, 
Anderson, Russell, & Hebert, 1995) in the general population , while other studies 
estimate across community care rates of 1-11% (McBeth & Jones, 2007). The 
prevalence of Irritable Bowel Syndrome in Europe and the UK ranges from 8-22% 
(Müller-Lissner et al., 2001) and accounts for 12% of GP consultations (Drossman, 
Camilleri, Mayer, & Whitehead, 2002).  
 
Despite the diversity in estimates of MUS there is widespread agreement that such 
patients consume disproportionately large amounts of healthcare resources across all 
healthcare settings (Barsky, Orav, & Bates, 2005; Smith, Monson, & Ray, 1986; 
Wayne Katon, Lin, von Korff, & Russo, 1991; Reynolds, Vernon, Bouchery, & 
Reeves, 2004; Robinson et al., 2003; Reynolds, et al., 2004) to little effect. Evidence 
suggests specific use of healthcare resources irrespective of mental or physical 
comorbidities (Barsky, Orav, & Bates, 2005;Rief, Martin, Klaiberg, & Brähler, 2005; 
Smith Jr, Monson, & Ray, 1986). Even so, studies across primary care consistently 
report that when MUS coexist with mental health problems this leads to increased use 
of healthcare resources (Haftgoli et al., 2010;Barsky, et al., 2005). Moreover, MUS 
patients report many days in bed a month (Smith, et al., 1986) as well as increased 
rates of sick leave (Hiller et al, 2003). Bermingham et al. (2010) estimated the cost of 
medically unexplained somatic symptoms among the working age population (18-65) 
in England. They report that indirect costs (i.e. productivity loss) and direct costs (use 
of health services) from MUS exceeded £14 billion in the fiscal year 2008-9. It is 
worth noting that Bermingham et al's estimate does not include the full range of MUS, 
as the authors did not, for instance, include functional somatic syndromes which are 
reported to have a considerable prevalence among both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Hungin, et al., 2005).   
 
The situation with long term conditions (LTC) is more complex and specific, but the 
broad principles still apply; where mental health problems co-exist and are not 
appropriately treated, then patients experience elevated levels of distress and their 
physical care is both more complex and costly. 
 
What are the treatment options? 
Almost by definition, MUS is not a diagnosis, but rather a residual category when 
other medical diagnoses have been excluded, something which obviously makes these 
problems difficult to treat in a coherent way.  At the same time, little benefit comes 
from the application of mental health diagnoses such as anxiety and depression as an 
alternative, despite the clear evidence of comorbidity, as patients understandably 
regard the focus as being incorrect where such problems are not clearly present. This 
issue can lead to problems with engagement in such treatment, making engagement a 
priority in any intervention. Such patients understandably do not view themselves as 
psychiatrically “ill”, but are concerned about their MUS and its implications. Some 
Health Professionals tend to assume that the full explanation of the range of problems 
described as MUS will be psychological, but this in the context of the absence of an 
adequate psychological account of their problems. Sometimes, the group is defined 
largely in terms of their help seeking behaviour alone e.g.“frequent attenders”, and it 
is clear that seeking medical help is common, expensive and of little value for such 
patients. A more pejorative term, “frequent flyers”, has also been used 
inappropriately. 
 
Fortunately, there is good evidence for the effectiveness of psychological 
interventions which clearly help people experiencing distressing and disabling levels 
of MUS. However, although the dominant modality in such treatments is said to be 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT), this treatment outcome research includes a 
dismaying variety of flavours, types and variants of CBT, mostly with a highly 
specialised emphasis and detailed (and different) treatment and training protocols. 
Mostly these approaches are specific to particular MUS, but even within narrower 
groupings a range of often quite different CBT approaches have been used for specific 
MUS with varying degrees of underpinning evidence. Examples of treatments for 
specific MUS include (but are not confined to) Chronic Pain, Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome, Non-Cardiac Chest Pain, Premenstrual Problems, Breathlessness, 
Dizzinesss, Insomnia and so on. Although delivering such a diversity of approaches 
may be feasible in a few larger secondary care settings, it is extremely unlikely that it 
will be possible to implement the range of such interventions in primary care; a 
different approach is needed. If it were possible to implement effectively a 
transdiagnostic approach to helping those experiencing psychological distress linked 
to the wide range of medically unexplained symptoms, then it would be reasonable to 
hope that such work could, with some adjustments, be applied to helping those 
experiencing excessive distress linked to persistent medically explained symptoms, 
sometimes know and “Long Term Conditions” (LTC). This exciting possibility will 
be briefly explored later in this paper.  
 
So, whilst it is clear that something more general in CBT terms would make sense 
from a pragmatic point of view, this needs to be balanced with the clear need to 
address the specific pattern of symptoms and disability seen in particular MUS. For 
example, avoidance and anxiety of agoraphobic proportions is often seen in Irritable 
Bowel syndrome, whilst fatigue and withdrawal from exertion can restrict those with 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) to an extraordinary degree but for quite different 
reasons. It seems unlikely that the same therapeutic strategies targeting these 
superficially similar behavioural restrictions would be effective, whilst it is also 
evident that there may be some commonalities in terms of the overarching structure of 
the treatment. On the basis of the way CBT has so successfully developed over the 
last half century or so, we suggest here that the solution is to adopt a hybrid 
transdiagnostic/specific approach. To place this in context, we will first consider the 
historical and conceptual development of transdiagnostic and specific approaches 
which has resulted in current strategies commonly used in CBT today, and what this 
tells us about the obstacles to the development and application of a 
transdiagnostic/specific hybrid treatment in MUS which could also be applied to 
psychological factors in LTC.  
 
The evolution of Behaviour Therapy into Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy: the 
admixture of the transdiagnostic and specific. 
 
In mental health settings, psychological approaches to both understanding and 
treatment has come to be dominated by Behavioural, Cognitive and Cognitive 
Behavioural theories and their related therapies (described here collectively as CB 
approaches). There are two factors which most likely explain the almost total shift 
from “traditional” psychotherapies to CB approaches. Firstly, governments, regulators 
and health care providers have adopted the principles of evidence based medicine, an 
approach which readily lends itself to this therapy modality. Secondly, and in our 
view more importantly, the development of CB approaches has at its heart treatment 
development and dissemination based on the interplay between psychological theory 
and research evidence (including but not confined to outcome research), with 
treatments developing and being applied on the basis not just of evidence based but 
empirically grounded approaches (Salkovskis 2009). Key aspects of problems and 
how they can be treated have been systematically investigated in the context of 
established, emerging and developing theories under the broad banners of BT, CT and 
CBT. Although this set of underpinnings is not specific to these approaches, 
traditional psychotherapies have more typically tended to develop according to 
schools of thought and therapy led by authoritative individuals or groups who are 
mostly unquestioned. 
 
There has been some shift towards embracing evidence in other “schools” of 
psychotherapy, at least in terms of outcomes (see for example Roth et al, 1996) but 
the field has been hobbled in terms of further development by its insistence on the 
primacy of the therapeutic relationship as the principal mechanism of change in 
therapy. CB approaches, by contrast, are clear that a trusting collaborative relationship 
is mostly necessary but seldom sufficient. The demonstrable effectiveness of written 
and computer/online based approaches to therapy (Andersson 2015) has strained the 
traditional conceptualisation of the therapeutic relationship almost to breaking point. 
We suggest here that the therapeutic relationship is a particularly good way of 
supporting people seeking help in the process of finding different ways of reacting to 
the situations and events, internal or external, which they find persistently distressing 
and problematic.   
 
For the present, CB approaches are, for most mental health problems, the treatments 
of choice, and this type of therapy continues to evolve and be refined (Clark 2004). 
The use of the plural “treatments” is not accidental. An early transdiagnostic approach 
to phobic anxiety (Wolpe, 1958), systematic desensitisation based on the theory of 
reciprocal inhibition evolved into exposure. Exposure was also applied across phobic 
anxiety disorders (Marks1979) becoming, in the 1970s more divergent in application 
and began to include completely new conceptualisations, broadening out from 
anxiety. Thus, a different approach was indicated for depression, with behavioural 
(Ferster1973, Seligman, 1972) and cognitive behavioural approaches developing 
(Beck,1976; Abrahamson, Seligman a& Teasdale, 1978). The 1980s and 1990s saw a 
proliferation and expansion of a range of disparate CB approaches, with the 
development of highly specific treatment for a range of diagnoses both within anxiety 
(e.g. Panic, Social Phobia, OCD) and more broadly (e.g. Eating Disorders, Chronic 
Pain, Psychosis) (Hawton et al 1989).  
 
Whilst it was clear that the development of these increasingly specific treatments was 
associated with bigger effect sizes relative to earlier versions of treatment, there were 
also reasons to be concerned for the field as a whole. Instead of learning a single 
approach to psychological treatment, therapists who wanted to deliver state-of-the-art 
treatment had to learn multiple approaches, even within diagnostic groupings such as 
Anxiety Disorders or Eating Disorders (Wilamowska et al, 2010; Fairburn et al, 
2003). As therapies became specialised so also did the therapists, and this in the 
context of still evolving treatments. Simply put, therapists and health services 
struggled to keep up. Other issues such as the common problem of comorbidity mean 
that there are concerns about the development of highly specialist therapists focussing 
on particular specific problems.  
 
In this climate of proliferating and divergent treatments, clinical researchers began to 
seek treatments which would bring together the best of the effective treatments 
without being so specialised. In eating disorders Fairburn and colleagues (Fairburn, 
Cooper and Shafran, 2003) presented a transdiagnostic theory and related 
transdiagnostic treatment across eating disorders. Various transdiagnostic approaches 
to anxiety have been proposed, including those of Norton et al (2012) and David 
Barlow’s Unified Protocol for Emotional Disorders (Wilamowska et al, 2010). 
 
We are now at an important point in the development of CBT. Specific treatments and 
transdiagnostic treatments have both been found to be effective to varying degrees. 
Thus far, guidelines such as those produced by the National Health Service body 
NICE tend to favour more specific approaches for each anxiety disorder and 
depression. However, if taken in the context of stepped care, in which less severe and 
chronic conditions are treated with “lighter touch” and less focussed treatments than 
more sever and chronic problems, then it seems that both transdiagnostic and specific 
approaches may have roles to play without adopting a full on “one size fits all” 
strategy.  
 
CBT is and isn’t transdiagnostic, so it can be applied to MUS 
Examination of currently recommended CBT approaches to the range of disorders 
where it is recommended suggests that, having started from common principles set 
out by Wolpe, Beck and others, there has been some convergence in terms of the 
fundamental principles underpinning treatment, with differences being mainly in the 
details of how these principles are applied to each case and type of case. We propose 
that understanding how to blend in a skilful way these two ways of working is key to 
the effective treatment of MUS, using a hybrid transdiagnostic/specific approach  
 
Treatment thus starts, regardless of the specific problem, with the therapist engaging 
with the patient, and from this undertaking an assessment which allows them to 
develop a formulation which should be used as the basis for the development of a 
shared understanding. The shared understanding will provide the basis for the 
therapist and client agreeing on strategies which the client can be supported in 
deploying and evaluating in terms of their impact on their distress and experience of 
symptoms. This is of course the key to engaging the patient, something which has 
been described in some detail as successful in the treatment of severe health anxiety 
where disease conviction is a major issue (Salkovskis et al 2003). The shared 
understanding, often referred to as formulation, evolves throughout the course of 
treatment. In the early stages of therapy it may be more generic, becoming more 
focussed on particular symptoms as treatment progresses. Towards the later stages of 
treatment, some strategies will be highly specific to the particular pattern of 
symptoms and responses experienced by the particular client. Thus, once a 
preliminary shared understanding is agreed, the basis for more transdiagnostic 
interventions includes but is not confined to cognitive restructuring (helping patients 
to identify and change the distorted pattern of thinking and meaning they attach to 
their symptoms) behavioural activation, exposure to feared situations as behavioural 
experiments and applied relaxation. The latter stages of treatment focus on more 
specific aspects of the MUS, such “agoraphobic” type fears in IBS patients who have 
fears of imminently soiling themselves, beliefs about the potential longer-term 
catastrophic effects of physical activity in CFS and pain patients and so on.  
 
To achieve a formulation which can be effectively transformed into a shared 
understanding, we believe that a core model (acting as a template from which some or 
all of the components can be used to identify key processes) is required. As our 
starting point, we consider that the cognitive-behavioural model of health anxiety 
which forms the basis of treatment of those who have excessive anxiety linked to 
health concerns is likely to be particularly valuable (Salkovskis and Warwick, 1986; 
Warwick and Salkovskis 1990). This treatment has been shown to be effective in 
those primarily identified as experiencing health anxiety in the absence of significant 
physical health challenges (e.g. Clark et al, 1998). More recently, we have shown that 
the treatment for health anxiety generalises to medical populations screened for the 
presence of health anxiety even when the therapists were not highly expert in CBT 
and were trained specifically in the treatment of health anxiety in this setting (Tyrer et 
al, 2014).  
 
However, it is also clear from the most cursory consideration of the literature on MUS 
that health anxiety (or general anxiety), although often important, cannot account for 
all distress in MUS. For example, although the majority of chronic pain patients 
experience significant levels of health anxiety, some do not (Rode et al, 2006). 
Although it is not clear as to the extent of health anxiety in CFS, it is likely to be 
lower than that seen in chronic pain, with other emotions, particularly depression, 
being prominent. Although CBT models for anxiety, including health anxiety, tend to 
be transdiagnostic, there are major differences with depression. What is needed, then, 
is theoretical model similar to those used to guide specific treatments in anxiety and 
depression which allows the merging of these and other emotional responses in the 
production of symptom related distress.  
 
A Cognitive Behavioural model which incorporates both transdiagnostic and 
“disorder specific” elements in understanding the development and maintenance of 
symptoms and, crucially, disability, would seem particularly promising for treatment 
of conditions within the spectrum of MUS. Such an approach is attractive not least 
because of the effectiveness already demonstrated with respect to the treatment of 
HealthAnxiety/Hypochondriasis inter alia. We take the view that primary care is the 
key setting to both understanding MUS and lessening the debilitating effects of this 
range of conditions for patients and address the devastating direct and indirect 
economic impact of MUS.  
 
Something old, something new and much that is borrowed: constructing a 
Transdiagnostic model for MUS.  
Cognitive model of severity of anxiety 
Unsurprisingly, the model starts from the most fundamental assumption of Cognitive 
approaches, which is that it is not the particular situation, event or stimulus that 
generates an emotional response, but rather the meaning the person attaches to their 
particular experience (Beck 1976). When applied to physical symptoms, this means 
that a particular bodily variation will elicit an emotional response according to what it 
means to them; that is, how they interpret or appraise it. Simply speaking, it goes like 
this 
Bodily variation (physical sensation or other perceived bodily change),  
and/or medically relevant information 
 
Meaning 
 
Emotion 
Why would some people misinterpret their experience of symptoms and medical 
issues in a particularly negative way? The cognitive theory suggests that some 
combination of prior beliefs and experience and the formation of currently unhelpful 
assumptions is responsible in a complex way (Salkovskis, 1996); in treatment terms, 
however, this is seldom the starting point. The cognitive model also assumes that the 
extent and severity of emotional response arises from the details of the meaning; 
However, this perception of meaning (in the case of MUS, typically in terms of 
illness , disability and disease) relates in turn to a variety of factors; that is 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The elements in this conceptualisation are: (i) the perceived probability of the feared 
consequence such as progressively worsening illness; more likely is of course worse; 
(ii) how severe this consequence will be (in terms of it's likelihood of disabling, of 
being ultimately fatal, of interfering with key parts of the person's life and functioning 
and so on);(iii) how capable the person would be of coping with the illness they 
believe they have and all of its consequences; and (iv) how likely it would be that 
other factors would intervene to reduce the severity and the person's ability to cope 
(such as medical treatment, support from others and so on). For sad or depressed 
mood, future issues are transposed to past concerns and events or situations which 
have already happened.  
 
Clearly, this view indicates why people may, at any specific time, experience 
particularly negative emotions when they notice bodily variations or otherwise 
X 
+ 
perceived 
“awfulness” 
   if it did 
                               perceived 
                               rescue  
                               factors 
perceived 
 coping ability 
when it does 
___________________________ 
perceived           
likelihood  
it will happen           
become concerned about aspects of their health, and why these emotions may 
sometimes be severe and potentially overwhelming (Salkovskis, 2010). The next step 
in developing a comprehensive model is to specify the factors involved in the 
persistence of such experiences (i.e. what maintains them and potentially creates 
intense and persistent psychological distress), as opposed to more transient experience 
of noticing bodily changes. Such an understanding can and should form the basis of a 
shared understanding between therapist and service user at an early stage in treatment. 
What is shown here as Figure 1 is the simplest template for the application of 
cognitive-behavioural approach to individuals; as indicated below, this template 
should be used collaboratively to develop a shared understanding, applying those 
components identified at assessment in the form described by the service user. Such a 
model also needs to be able to incorporate factors identified as important in 
maintaining low mood and impairment, starting with the central importance of the 
interpretation of health-relevant events, information and/or stimuli as particularly 
negative (including a sense of threat or loss). Here we will apply cognitive-
behavioural conceptualisation to MUS/LTC. 
 
These MUS/LTC models need to be empirically grounded and to incorporate factors 
identified as important in generating and maintaining low mood, anxiety and 
impairment (both in terms of distress and behaviourally). Given that most models of 
treatment for which there is an evidence base are cognitive-behavioural and these 
assume that the interpretation/appraisal of health-relevant events, information and/or 
stimuli as particularly negative (including a sense of danger, threat or loss), this 
provides the focus of the present discussion. Typically these appraisal factors are 
highly specific (cf Cognitive theory of Panic and Health Anxiety), as has already been 
demonstrated in research into the appraisal of symptoms specific to CFS, IBS and 
MS, inter alia. 
Key transdiagnostic factors which can be involved in the maintenance of 
psychological distress and disability in MUS 
Although the key appraisals/interpretations are idiosyncratic and typically will be 
identified on a case by case basis as part of assessment and formulation/shared 
understanding, the types most likely to be seen are drawn from a relatively narrow 
range of domains, and can include catastrophizing, mental defeat (conceptualised as 
“social role” catastrophizing) especially as linked to fear of progression/reinjury/harm 
in the event of failing to engage in Safety Seeking Behaviours/avoidance. (Fear of 
Death and Dying will also for some be an issue, sometimes tied up with 
metaphysical/spiritual concerns.) The impact of such appraisals can be magnified by 
other tendencies, which can be expressed as “thinking errors”, including but not 
confined to “all or nothing thinking”. It is unclear to what extent these are general or 
specific, but this probably doesn’t matter in terms of treatment. In most instances it 
will be possible to identify a vicious circle of avoidance of activity/safety seeking, 
erratic patterns of activity, cognitive changes and physiological changes which are 
involved in the maintenance of negative symptom perception in terms of 
catastrophizing of what is currently happening, the belief that the original infection or 
injury is still causing the problems and fears about the future course of the person’s 
illness.  
 
Interpretations and appraisals thus remain key, and drive or motivate some or several 
categories of largely transdiagnostic maintaining processes which keep the 
problematic beliefs in place. These maintaining process in turn can and do worsen the 
negative interpretations and may affect physical as well as psychological functioning. 
Broadly these maintaining processes, which need to be identified and dealt with in 
treatment, have the effect of forming feedback processes (“vicious circles”) and 
include both generalized and more specific factors, although this distinction is at best 
crude as applied here.  
Specific factors  
(a) Mood changes, particularly anxiety and depression, contributing to mood-
appraisal spirals; linked to this may, in some instances, negative beliefs about 
emotions.  
(b) Attentional processes (both automatic and strategic); these can increase perceived 
severity and pervasiveness of sensations and symptoms (amplification, “looking for 
trouble”) and acuity, with the affected person becoming more accurate at identifying 
sensations and changes in these, with the net effect of an apparent increase in 
sensations both acutely and chronically; 
(c) Emotional avoidance/suppression, particularly linked to anticipated emotional 
responses and unhelpful beliefs about those emotions; at its most extreme, can amount 
to “denial” in the sense of the person temporarily “blotting out” illness ideas, but with 
regular intrusions and unease as a consequence; 
(d) Safety seeking behaviours, including (but not confined to) checking (self and 
information, e.g. internet), avoidance of physical activity or situations, and excessive 
reassurance seeking, all of which tend to increase preoccupation and lead to 
exaggerated concern (“if I hadn’t sat down I would have collapsed”) 
(e) All or nothing (“boom or bust”) behaviour, with the alternation between attempts 
to undertake more than the person is physically or psychologically capable of at that 
particular time with the experience of symptom surges (e.g. fatigue, pain) on or after 
stopping, leading to more negative appraisal 
(f) Generalized withdrawal not only from physical activity but from role-related 
activity, such as relationships, work, hobbies, resulting in impaired mood, general 
disengagement from rewarding activities and problems arising from “disuse” 
(g) Rumination, both as a form of catastrophizing and as worry, preparing for the 
worst, as self-protective “problem solving” and so on, priming negative ideas and 
increasing preoccupation  
 (h) Autonomic arousal including panic-type (imminent threat) and health anxiety 
(delayed threat) increasing other factors and directly feeding negative appraisals 
(i) Alterations in other physiological factors; in LTC and to an unknown degree in 
MUS, including but not confined to pathophysiological changes. Working with the 
latter will require specialist knowledge. Other transdiagnostic factors likely to impact 
are sleep and circadian rhythm changes; these may increase sensitivity both physically 
and emotionally, serving a further amplification function and so on.  
(j) Disuse issues and deconditioning especially in CFS, Pain related problems and 
those conditions associated with fear/avoidance patterns with respect to exercise, such 
as heart disease and COPD. Somewhat related are more specific factors such as bowel 
dysregulation. All are likely to have implications for changes in the course of 
treatment.  
(k) Although Medically Unexplained Symptoms are Medically Unexplained, there are 
a range of observations from physically focussed research which may account for 
some of what is occurring, either interacting with or independent of psychological 
processes. By definition these issues are poorly understood, but can be incorporated 
into formulation. For example, the impact of cortisol may at times be worth 
considering in terms of problems such as CFS, pain pathways and so on.  
(l) Imagery and intrusive memories, increasing negative appraisals and impacting 
mood disturbance  
(m) Interpersonal changes linked to sense of unfairness, bitterness, mental defeat, 
eliciting negative or unhelpful responses from those around the affected person, 
including over-solicitous behaviour.  
Generalised Factors  
It is also important to recognise a number of generalized vulnerability factors and 
mechanisms which can lead both to vulnerability to the above maintaining factors and 
may at times actually mediate them; the extent to which they are present varies 
somewhat across conditions. These are: 
Clinical/negative perfectionism, especially unrelentingly high personal standards and 
concern about mistakes (social and non-social). Generalised beliefs both in terms of 
“conditional assumptions” (often also linked to perfectionism) and unconditional 
assumptions, sometimes referred to as “core beliefs”. Problems with psychological 
inflexibility, which results in the person being “stuck” in a particular view of what is 
happening to them (especially in terms of their illness) is almost by definition a key 
aspect of the experience of MH problems linked to MUS/LTC. Such inflexibility will 
have the effect of limiting the person’s repertoire both in terms of the accessibility of 
alternative, less negative understandings of their situation and their capacity for 
engaging in problem solving and therefore limiting their behavioural repertoire. Key 
to treatment is increasing flexibility so the person has more options open to them in 
all of these domains. 
   
Figure 1: Transdiagnostic model incorporating major maintaining factors of distress 
and disability 
 
In Figure 1, for MUS the usual trigger (“Events and Situations”) is most likely in 
MUS to be the perception of a bodily variation, such as feeling fatigued, pain, 
stomach churning and so on. These may be normal variations or arise from some 
physical abnormality; it is not necessary in term formulating to distinguish these, 
although to do so according to the maintaining factors identified above will 
sometimes be valuable and helpful. It is seldom possible, at least early on in 
assessment, to identify precisely why this is negatively interpreted, and this usually 
does not matter unless it is felt appropriate to focus on the general maintaining factors 
discussed above. Sometimes the source of misinterpretation is more transient, for 
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example, arising from events in the patient's social network or from the mass media, 
or more enduring but specific, for example from previous experience of physical ill-
health in themselves and/or in their families, and previous experience of 
unsatisfactory medical management in themselves or others. Sometimes there may be 
obvious assumptions which make the person vulnerable to such appraisals, such as the 
belief that "bodily changes are usually a sign of serious disease, because every 
symptom has to have an identifiable physical cause". Such beliefs may also relate to 
the perception of specific personal weaknesses and particular illnesses; for example, 
"there's heart trouble in the family", "I've had weak lungs since I was a baby". Such 
beliefs may be a constant source of anxiety and/or may be activated in vulnerable 
individuals by critical incidents. Assumptions can also lead the patient to selectively 
attend to information which appears to confirm the idea of having an illness, and to 
selectively ignore or discount evidence indicating good health. Thus, particular 
assumptions often lead to a confirmatory bias in the patient's thinking once a critical 
incident has resulted in the misinterpretation of bodily symptoms and signs as being 
indications of serious illness. Further bodily sensations are noticed as a consequence 
of increased vigilance arising from the appraisal; this forms a feedback loop. Selective 
attention to illness related information, such as the perception of normal bodily 
changes (e.g. gastric distension after eating) or previously unnoticed bodily features 
(e.g. blotchy complexion) is often important. Focussing prompted by worries about 
health brings slight bodily variations to awareness at times when ideas about illness 
are already present, leading to a bias towards noticing information that is consistent 
with the worries about illness, and with any pre-existing confirmatory bias. 
In patients who become particularly anxious about their health, such situations are 
associated with thoughts which represent personally catastrophic interpretations of the 
bodily sensations or signs. Note that, if the symptoms which are misinterpreted are 
those which occur as part of anxiety-induced autonomic arousal and the interpretation 
is that the symptoms are the signs of immediate catastrophe (e.g. "these palpitations 
mean that I am having a heart attack right now"), a further immediate increase in 
symptoms will result, resulting in a panic-type reaction, as anxiety worsens the feared 
sensations apparently confirming the catastrophizing. In any case, Anxiety about 
health and symptoms themselves is likely to result in physiological arousal. Patients 
often misinterpret increased autonomic symptoms as further evidence of a physical 
disease.   
 
Having made a negative appraisal, there is a simple “mood appraisal spiral” effect; the 
person who thinks negatively experiences strong negative emotions; these strong 
negative emotions serve to strengthen the negative thinking, worsening the negative 
emotions in ways familiar from Depression and GAD.  
 
There is a further potential negative effect arising from the emotional response; the 
experience of negative mood can act as a powerful trigger for past memory, including 
but not confined to traumatic memories; these memories can directly increase the 
accessibility of negative thinking, and/or provoke further rumination, probably 
including preoccupation with issues such as “mental defeat”, where the person 
believes themselves to be undermined as a socially functioning and respected person.  
 
Having made a negative illness or disability related appraisal, most patients then react 
behaviourally. Such reactions can take several forms; either unhelpful safety seeking 
behaviour, intended to avoid, check for or totally exclude physical illnesses or 
attempts to ameliorate the symptoms and their consequences through withdrawal from 
activities perceived as provoking symptoms. Examples can include avoiding physical 
exertion, avoiding reminders of disease, seeking reassurance directly from medics or 
through internet searches, frequent medical consultations, bodily checking, 
manipulation of areas of the body and repeated inspection). Behaviour occurring as a 
consequence of perception of threat or harm can further increase negative emotions 
reactions in a variety of ways. It can keep attention focused on health worries and can 
therefore result in elaboration of those concerns. It can increase the range and scope 
of catastrophic interpretations through repeated rumination. Reassurance as provided 
by others can also increase the scope of worries; for example, the patient who is 
concerned that his headaches indicate high blood pressure can be misunderstood by 
his doctor, who tells him that "Your headaches cannot be the sign of a brain tumour; if 
they were, you would notice dizziness, and would lose your sense of smell". Other 
examples include a patient who began to check his physical fitness, and found that he 
was more out of breath than a colleague after climbing some stairs, which he 
interpreted as a sign that there is something wrong with his lungs. Another patient 
who checked his throat by repeatedly swallowing to ensure that it was functioning 
properly; he became convinced that the difficulty he noticed in repeated swallowing 
meant that he had throat cancer.  
 
In many MUS, the behaviours seen are more about managing symptom intensity; for 
example, withdrawing from normal physical and social activities because of fatigue or 
pain, or the perceived risk of consequences of persisting, such as having a bowel 
accident or a heart attack. Such withdrawal then means that the person has less 
positive experiences, and may also serve to prevent the person from discovering that 
the things they fear will not happen. It can also lead to a “boom as bust” pattern as 
described above.  
 
Note that the formulation “template” depicted here can and should incorporate 
additional elements including those set out above as specific and general maintaining 
factors. Also, links across maintaining factors may be present; for example, the link 
between negative interpretations and perceptions of physical symptoms can be 
variously mediated by a panic type link, with anxiety directly generating symptoms, 
behaviours where a slower escalation would be involved, selective attention and 
increased sensitivity and so on. Additionally, other links between elements are likely 
to operate in specific instances. The template forms an empirically based starting 
point which can be developed on a semi-idiographic basis with individual patients as 
assessment and treatment itself progresses. It can also vary in complexity, from that 
depicted in the figure both upwards and downwards. In some instances a single 
vicious circle may be involved, although this would be rare.  
 
Transdiagnostic treatment: A brief overview, stage by stage 
To those already working with formulation based CBT, particularly with health 
anxiety and related problems, treatment principles will be familiar. 
1. The overriding principle is that therapy aims to help the patient identify what the 
problem is rather than to reassure the patient or convince them that "nothing is 
wrong". In both MUS and LTC physical issues can and should be incorporated into 
the formulation as a key factor linked directly to the meanings identified.    
2. Acknowledge that patients' symptoms by definition really exist, and that adopting a 
psychological approach does not imply in any sense that symptoms are "imaginary". 
Treatment aims to discover satisfactory explanation for the perceived symptoms and 
more helpful ways of responding to them. This may involve psychological factors in 
the same way as, for example, tension headaches or a racing heart under stress. 
3. Reassurance is part of the problem, not a solution to it. However tempting, giving 
irrelevant or repetitive information will not help these patients. By definition, they 
have already have had too much, and it is likely that attempts to reassure will worsen 
rather than help their problems.  
4. Treatment sessions should never become argumentative; the use of questioning as 
guided discovery is the preferred style, as in cognitive therapy in general. 
5. Patients' beliefs are invariably based on evidence which they find convincing; 
rather than discounting a belief, discover the observations which the patient believes 
to be evidence of illness and then work collaboratively with the patient on that basis.  
6. Treatment is explicitly time-limited on the basis of an agreed contract of therapy 
intended to fulfil the therapist's requirements whilst respecting the patient's worries 
about the possible consequences of not pursuing medical treatment. 
7. The selective attention and sensitivity to bodily variations typical of many of these 
patients can be used to demonstrate the way in which anxiety can arise from 
innocuous circumstances, symptoms and information. This means that within session 
shifts in affect and symptoms are as important or more important than in other 
problems. For example, the fact that bringing to mind a threat-related image induced 
some of the symptoms which are normally interpreted as a sign of cancer is an 
important demonstration of the validity of the psychological formulation. 
8. What the patients have understood about what has been said during the treatment 
sessions must always be checked by asking them to summarise what has been said 
and its implications for them. The importance of this lies in the very real likelihood 
that patients anxious about their health will misinterpret information discussed within 
the therapy session. The use of audiotapes of the session for the patients' use helps in 
this respect, but within- and end of session summaries are also crucial. Where 
misinterpretation has occurred (as indicated by the summary), then this is another 
opportunity to provide validation for the alternative explanation, by discussing the 
occurrence of misinterpretations within the therapy session.  
 
Treatment: stages of understanding and change 
The central components and stages of engagement in assessment, assessment itself 
leading to formulation, engagement in treatment and actual treatment are very similar 
to those used in common mental health problems, albeit with more explicit attention 
to engagement issues and with some components of treatment strategies varying 
according to the particular symptom configuration experienced by the patient and any 
physical issues at work. That is, some of the specific discussion techniques and 
behavioural experiments required for Chronic Fatigue as opposed to, say, irritable 
bowel problems, may vary considerably (although the principles are usually the 
same). The most substantial variations will tend to come where the predominant 
emotion is anxiety as opposed to depression. Similarly, in assessment some 
understanding of the issues experienced by those with such different pattern of 
symptoms is needed. This is why the treatment is described as a hybrid of 
transdiagnostic and specific components.  
Whether formally or informally, the first stage is screening, problem identification 
and determination of treatment appropriateness/suitability, often linked to a general 
clinical assessment. This may be carried out by physical healthcare staff or those 
involved in offering psychological treatment, according to the setting. At this point 
where possible screening tools, general measures and assessment specific measures 
should be used; these can and should used to track progress throughout treatment. See 
table for a summary of our preferred assessment tools. The first section includes the 
more general assessments which should be used transdiagnostically, the second those 
where a particular symptom is present. Note that the table also includes measures 
which can be used to tap into key maintaining factors as well as specific symptoms. In 
addition to the importance of monitoring treatment, these more specific measures 
allow identification of maintaining and tracking of such factors. 
Table1. Preferred assessment tools for MUS 
Primary 
measure 
Instrument Description 
Trans-diagnostic measures 
Physical 
symptoms 
Medically unexplained 
symptoms checklist (MUSC) 
MUSC is a new self-report measure for MUS 
developed by members of our group. It measures 
7 different types of physical symptoms that 
seriously interfere with daily life.  
Depressive 
symptoms 
Patient health questionnaire 
(PHQ-9) (Kroenke, Spizer 
and Williams, 2001) 
PHQ-9 is 9 item self-report scale that measures 
depressive symptoms over a two week period 
prior to answering.   
Anxiety 
symptoms 
General Anxiety Disorder -7 
(GAD-7) (Spitzer, Kroenke, 
Williams and Löwe, 2006) 
GAD-7 is a 7 item self-report scale that screens 
for and assesses the severity of anxiety 
symptoms two weeks prior to answering. 
Health anxiety Short Health Anxiety 
Inventory (SHAI) 
(Salkovskis, Rimes, Warwick 
and Clark., 2002) 
SHAI is an 18 item version of the Health Anxiety 
Inventory that measures health related anxiety.  
Disability The work and social 
adjustment scale (WSAS) 
(Mundt et.al., 2002) 
WSAS is a 5 item self-report scale that measures 
impaired functioning in everyday activities. 
Symptom specific measures 
Sleep problems Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) 
(Bastien, Vallières and 
Morin, 2001) 
ISI is a 7 item self-report scale that measures 
sleep-onset and sleep maintenance difficulties, 
dissatisfaction with sleep patterns, interference 
with daily functioning and degree of stress 
caused by the problem. 
Pain problems Brief Pain Inventory (BPI) 
(Tan et.al., 2004) 
BPI is an 11 item self-report scale with 4 items 
that measure pain severity and 7 items that 
measure pain interference with daily activities. 
 Treatment proper begins with a full cognitive-behavioural assessment. Such an 
assessment involves the personal history, development of the problem, and present 
pattern of symptoms. Fuller engagement takes place at this stage, and is crucial as a 
two-way process; that is, the therapist getting to know the patient and helping the 
patient to get to know the therapists. In a real sense, the assessment is a two-way 
process, with the more important assessment (in terms of engagement) being that of 
the therapist by the patient! Following this relatively general process, a more focused 
assessment is used to develop a cognitive-behavioural formulation which includes 
both etiological and maintaining factors, with the initial primary focus being of the 
Fatigue and 
related problems 
Chalder Fatigue Scale 
(Chalder et.al., 1993) 
The CFS is and 14 item self-report scale that 
measures physical and mental fatigue. 
Gastro-intestinal 
problems 
Irritable Bowel Syndrome 
Severity Scoring System 
(IBS-SSS) (Francis, Morris 
and Whorwell, 1997) 
IBS-SSS contains 4 items that specifically 
address IBS symptom severity. These items 
measure problems with abdominal pain, 
distension, bowel habits and interference of 
symptoms with daily life. 
Heart and chest 
symptoms 
Non-Cardiac Chest Pain 
Scale (Marks et al, 2014) 
This measure uses a frequency rating then 8 1-10 
ratings of severity, interference and beliefs about 
chest pain 
Dizziness and 
related problems 
A range of measures have 
been used; no current 
consensus 
 
Gynaecological 
problems 
Symptom diaries are 
typically used  
 
Process measures 
Mental defeat Emotional reactions to 
difficult circumstances (Tang 
and Salkovskis, 2004). 
The instrument is 24 item self-report scale that 
measures mental defeat related to physical 
symptoms. The scale is a generic version of the 
Pain Self Perception Scale.  
Catastrophic 
thinking 
Physical Symptoms 
Catastrophizing Scale 
(PSCS) 
The PSCS is a new 19 item scale developed by 
our group to measure catastrophic thinking in 
relation to physical symptoms.  
Rumination The Rumination Response 
Scale (RRS) (Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow, 
1991) 
The RRS is a 22 item scale that measures 
depression related rumination. With slight 
alterations the scale can be adjusted for 
measuring rumination in the context of physical 
symptoms. 
way the person interprets/appraises their experience of illness related phenomena. 
This phase may also include Liaison with GPs and other medical staff as appropriate 
given the patient’s diagnosis and symptoms. The development of a formulation is 
crucial because the principal aim of treatment is to provide the patient with an 
explanation of their current experience based on their account of their experience as 
offered during this assessment, with the end result being and explicitly collaborative 
model of how psychological factors may contribute to the person's problem and 
interact with physical factors where present. These should, of course, be incorporated 
into the formulation itself. This collaborative approach contrasts sharply with the all 
too common practice of trying to deal with the patient’s worries by offering bland 
reassurance, which depends on trying to convince the patient that they are not 
suffering from the illnesses that they fear. Arriving at a formulation of MUS 
symptoms can be expected to take between one and two sessions.  
Because it is the fundamental basis of treatment, the formulation is revised and 
adapted frequently throughout the treatment period, and is always extended to cover 
new information which emerges. Once it has been shared, the therapist can progress 
 
Discussion techniques and behavioural experiments refer constantly to this 
formulation as an alternative explanation. The patient is thus helped to make sense of 
their symptoms from a psychological perspective by a combination of (i) self 
monitoring of symptoms, their precipitants, behaviour, thoughts and emotional 
responses; (ii) detailed discussion aimed at helping the patient attribute feared 
symptoms more accurately; (iii) behavioural experiments which provide the patient 
with further and especially convincing evidence of the non-threatening and/or counter 
productive nature of their problems, linked to the shared understanding. As therapy 
progresses, discussion and behavioural experiments are increasingly used to challenge 
problematic assumptions about symptoms, illness and health. Behavioural 
experiments may also focus on helping the person clarify issues around specific 
physiological factors, such as the development of disuse problems and how these 
might be overcome, impact of sleep disturbance, problems with “boom and bust” and 
so on. Where possible, specific reattribution of sensations and symptoms is 
undertaken, includes discussion strategies and behavioural experiments intended to 
positively increase belief in psychological components of the formulation. Where 
appropriate, discrimination between physical and psychological components of 
sensations/symptoms (and their interaction) will be helpful. Note that this will often 
require specific knowledge on the part of the therapist.  
 
 
In many instances, therapy goes on to refocus on more general assumptions or other 
psychological factors (e.g. perfectionism) which make the patient vulnerable to 
cognitive distortions. The patient's attention is drawn to the rather more complex 
nature of their concerns described in the preceding section (probability, cost, coping 
ability and rescue factors), and therapy may be explicitly directed at the last three as 
well as the first. Issues such as the basis of the person's self esteem are tackled in this 
last stage. Attitude change, including dealing with attitudes concerning health, illness 
and the medical profession. Also challenging beliefs about "awfulness", coping, 
rescue factors and "superstitious" attitudes and beliefs. Work on perfectionism and 
cognitive styles such as catastrophizing, Black and white thinking (“all or nothing” ) 
may also be relevant where these issues are present.  
Where relevant, specific attention to excessive medical consultation issues is 
appropriate. 
Although this may have featured to some degree throughout, more specific strategies 
related to the particular diagnoses may be deployed once the formulation is in place.  
 
The Anxiety of the Clinician 
When working with a patient experience physical sensations and bodily variations 
which are “medically unexplained”, clinicians are understandably prone to 
experiencing doubts and concerns. What if this really is what the patient fears it to be? 
What if I am missing a dangerous medical condition? Such concerns on the part of 
both physicians and psychological therapists require attention. Note that the presence 
of psychological factors is not simply deduced from the absence of a medical 
diagnosis to explain the person’s symptoms or the extent of their disability, but rather 
from the use of strategies of assessment based formulation which lead to a shared 
understanding of how psychological processes interact with the experience of physical 
sensations and bodily variations.  
Over and above the strategy of clearly identifying psychological factors and how they 
operate in the individual, it is still not uncommon for the professionals involved 
(including the cognitive-behavioural therapist) to have doubts and fears about the 
possible physical basis of the symptoms reported. There is a simple "rule of thumb" 
which should be applied where such doubts arise, and which can be shared by the 
therapist with the physicians involved in the care of such patients and the patients 
themselves. Both health care professionals and the patient usually find the application 
of this rule useful (and reassuring!). When concerns arise, the therapist and/or doctor 
is asked to consider the clinical picture presented as a whole, including the patient's 
history, the nature of the symptoms, the history (and timing) of previous physical 
investigations, the symptoms themselves and so on. The clinician then asks 
themselves: if this were a different patient with an identical clinical presentation and 
history (such as identical twin), but who was not as obviously anxious about his 
health, what would I do? The answer to that question should determine what is done 
in the particular case, and should be discussed with the patient in that way. Thus, any 
decisions regarding the need for further medical investigation is taken on the basis of 
the relevant clinical information, and is not influenced by the presence of anxiety. 
Applying this rule (and communicating it to other professionals such as family doctor) 
should mean that the patient is neither over-investigated nor under-investigated and 
deals with a fear often expressed by patients, the “cry wolf” problem. Quite early in 
therapy, patients often express the worry that any real ailment would not be taken 
sufficiently seriously. If they understand the “rule” described here, then this goes 
some way towards dealing with these fears.  
This could, of course, be taken as meaning that such an approach would apply only in 
those who are physically healthy. We argue here that this is not so, and indeed our 
most recent trial of health anxiety treatment was conducted in those being seen in a 
General Hospital setting and screening positive for health anxiety (Tyrer et al, 2014). 
Where a co-existing physical condition is present, then this is incorporated into the 
formulation. However, we suggest here that it is possible to go further than this, and 
offer psychological treatment where the main focus is a primary physical illness.  
Long Term Conditions  
MUS can also be linked to another major clinical problem, the experience of 
psychological distress associated with chronic long-term physical conditions (LTC). It 
seems clear that, in both instances, psychological aspects are crucial in terms of the 
extent to which those affected perceive themselves as disabled and experiencing poor 
quality of life related to their experience and interpretation of symptoms, but the 
application of psychiatric diagnoses are unlikely to be helpful and may indeed be 
counterproductive.  
 
We therefore consider it likely that better understanding and treatment of MUS is 
likely to be capable of generalisation to LTC, and we have already begun to apply 
some of the same principles (Hayter et al 2016). We have demonstrated that, in people 
with a diagnosis of Relapsing and Remitting Multiple Sclerosis (RRMS), the extent of 
perceived disability and impairment of quality of life is very substantially affected by 
the presence or absence of Health Anxiety. Put simply, those with high health anxiety 
with no detectable impairment of cognitive and physical function consider themselves 
to be more impaired that those with lower levels of health anxiety, who in turn are 
almost identical in terms of their perceptions to the community comparison group. If, 
as is possible, health anxiety is to some extent driving distress and disability 
experienced, then it is possible that treatment which seeks to reduce such anxiety may 
be helpful. This study has been replicated and, in a consecutive single case series, 
health anxiety was substantially reduced in 4/5 patients with RRMS (Carrigan et al, 
2016). We have since sought to replicate this work in patients with Parkinson’s 
disease, where both cognitive and physical impairment was evident, obtaining similar 
results in terms of the perception of cognitive impairment (Fixter et al, 2016). 
Interestingly, all participants underestimated the extent of their physical impairment 
(in a walking task). This suggests that, as in MUS, it may be most appropriate to use a 
hybrid Transdiagnostic/specific approach to treatment, with adaptations according to 
the specific LTC involved. There are already a number of studies on providing CBT 
based psychological help and support to people with specific LTC, indicating that the 
rationale used for the development of this type of treatment in MUS may generalise 
well.  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the development of Transdiagnostic and Specific approaches to 
CBT have reached the point where it is possible to develop and implement a hybrid 
approach which should optimise outcomes whilst minimising the additional training 
and supervision burden. The development of such an approach in MUS has been 
progressed and is now being piloted, and there are exciting opportunities in terms of 
future developments for Long-Term Conditions. Quite apart from the likely benefits 
to patients experiencing disability and distress linked to such problems, there are good 
reasons to believe that developing this approach as part of stepped care with relatively 
non-specialist therapists would more than pay for itself.  
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